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Abstract
We study how workersconcern for coworkersability (CfCA) a¤ects competition in the
labor market. We consider two rms o¤ering nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective
workers. Firms may di¤er in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous
in their ability (high or low), and in their taste for being employed by any of the two rms.
Workers receive a utility premium when employed by the rm hiring the workforce with larger
average ability and they su¤er a utility loss in the opposite case. These premiums/losses are
endogenously determined.
When workersability is observable and the di¤erence in rmsmarginal productivities is
strictly positive, we show that CfCA increases surplus but it also increases rmscompetition
for high-ability workers. As a result, CfCA benets high-ability workers but is detrimental
to rms. In addition, CfCA exacerbates the existing distortion in sorting of high-ability
workers to rms: too many workers are hired by the least e¢ cient rm. When ability is not
observable, the additional surplus appropriated by high-ability workers is eroded by overin-
centivization (countervailing incentives) and the more so when CfCA is high. Conversely,
high-typessorting improves when CfCA is low and remains the same when it is high.
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1 Introduction
Organizations are increasingly concerned with the quality of their workers as a source of compet-
itive advantage and are particularly eager to attract top performers. Studies of nancial-services
professionals and of lawyers have shown that the skills and experience of top professionals consti-
tute general human capitalthat contributes to the prestige of the organization; see Groysberg
and Lee (2008). The same holds true for professional business services rms and research insti-
tutions. As a result, many organizations compete aggressively to attract top performers. And,
in some industries, the mobility of top workers is further enhanced by their direct and exclusive
relationship to their clients, who are loyal to the professionals providing the service rather than
to the rm that employs them. In the same way, highly productive researchers bring their ability
and their network to the organization, inside and outside Academia, contributing to its success
and attractiveness.
On the supply side of the market, job seekers choose which organization to work for. In
the existing economic literature, this decision generally depends on the applicantspreferences
for the organizations o¤ering a vacancy and on the monetary compensation associated with the
posted job o¤ers. We innovate by assuming that workerschoice also depends on the quality of
their coworkers. Specically, we assume that the attractiveness of an organization increases with
the quality of its workforce. Think about young lawyers who just graduated from a prestigious
Law School. To which law rm should they apply for a position? Cravath or Skadden? The
choice naturally depends on the o¤ered salaries and on the two rmsamenities, but it is likely
to be also a¤ected by the (endogenous) average skills of the lawyers employed by each of the
two rms.
Why is workersutility increasing in their coworkersquality? First, workersutility may
be increasing in the share of high-ability coworkers because being employed in an organization
that hires a qualied workforce increases the workersfuture career prospects outside the rm,
for example because of a signaling mechanism. Second, working with top professionals may give
preferential access to resources, opportunities, and general perks/benets inside and outside
the organization.1 Third, top workers bring social status to the rm and the latter may be a
source of utility per se for its employees. Note that we disregard complementarities and possible
spillovers in term of productivity, which have been considered before, mainly in the management
literature (see Groysberg and Lee, 2008, Ertug et al., 2018, Tan and Netessine, 2019).
We take a rst step towards analyzing the role played by the concern for coworkersability
(CfCA) in the hiring process. We interpret such concern as a utility premium accruing to
1Think about the increased opportunity to have access to research funds and external contracts in renown
research institutions that have a strong reputation and visibility thanks to their top researchers and international
experts.
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workers employed in the organization hiring the majority of high-ability workers. In a labor
market where organizations compete to attract the best workers by o¤ering them nonlinear
contracts, we investigate how CfCA a¤ects workersselection. By doing so we want to address
the following questions. How does CfCA a¤ect competition to attract the best talents? How
does it shape nonlinear contracts and workers sorting between competing rms? How does
workersprivate information on ability (and the subsequent screening designed by employers)
a¤ect workerssorting when CfCA matters?
To study these questions we consider two rms and a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms
may di¤er in their marginal productivity while workers are heterogeneous with respect to their
ability, high or low, and with respect to their taste for being employed by any of the two rms.
In addition, high-ability workers care for the ability of their colleagues.2 Specically, their utility
increases if they are employed by the rm hiring the larger share of high-ability workers, and it
decreases if they are employed by the rm hiring the lower share of high-types. Firms compete
to attract workers by o¤ering nonlinear contracts. Optimal contracts are contingent on workers
ability and are designed in the utility space so that they are characterized by the (gross) indirect
utility (rent) o¤ered to the worker, and by the workers labor supply which corresponds to an
observable and contractible level of e¤ort. Workerssorting depends on the relative magnitude
of indirect utilities o¤ered by each rm to workers of di¤erent ability.
We rst derive the labor market equilibrium when workersability is observable, but their
taste for rms is not. This case is relevant for the senior job-market where candidatesprevious
outcomes are observable (e.g. successful lawsuits for a lawyer and the publications list for a
researcher). We nd that, when rms are identical, CfCA does not a¤ect surplus because rms
equally share the workforce of both types and neither premiums nor utility losses emerge. When
instead rms are heterogeneous, CfCA matters because workerssorting to rms is asymmetric.
The more productive rm hires a larger share of high-types and, to a lower extent, also a larger
share of low-types. As a result, the more e¢ cient rm always hires the workforce characterized by
the higher average ability. Here CfCA increases total surplus and high-ability workersutility but
it reduces both rmsprots. Intuitively, CfCA increases competition for high-ability workers
by reducing their mismatch disutility, and is thus detrimental to rms. If CfCA is su¢ ciently
large, a corner solution emerges, where the more e¢ cient rm hires all high-types.
We derive the allocation that maximizes an utilitarian social welfare function and compare
it to the market equilibrium. Workers sorting is always ine¢ cient when the two rms are
heterogeneous. Three di¤erent distortions of marginal workers sum up in the market equilibrium,
each of them results in having too many workers employed by the least e¢ cient rm. The rst
2 In an extension of the model we also study the case in which both high-and low-ability workers care about
the ability of their coworkers.
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distortion is caused by prot maximization: rms disregard mismatch disutility of all the workers
except the marginal ones. The second one depends on strategic interaction: the least e¢ cient
rm competes too aggressively while the most e¢ cient one accommodates too much. The third
distortion is the one generated by CfCA (and, again, strategic interaction); the latter implies
a positive externality for workers employed by the more e¢ cient rm and a negative one for
workers hired by the least e¢ cient rm that are only partially internalized in equilibrium.
We then derive screening contracts and workers sorting when neither taste for rms nor
workersability are observable by the rms. Private information on ability is relevant for instance
in the case of junior job-market applicants who had no opportunities yet to prove their talent
in practice. We show that, if the two rms are identical and/or CfCA is su¢ ciently low, then
the market allocation is incentive compatible. In case rms have di¤erent productivities the
market allocation continues to be incentive compatible when CfCA is su¢ ciently low and rms
heterogeneity is su¢ ciently lower than workersheterogeneity. Otherwise, the market allocation
is not incentive compatible and, depending on which incentive constraints are binding, one of
three di¤erent regimes emerges. Regime 1 realizes for low values of CfCA and low workers
heterogeneity, Regime 2 emerges for intermediate values of CfCA, while Regime 3 emerges for
su¢ ciently larger levels of CfCA. In the three regimes, obviously screening contracts entail some
upward/downward distortions of e¤ort levels. Consequently, ine¢ cient e¤ort levels obtain on
top of the distortions in workerssorting.
In Regime 1 and 2, workers sorting di¤ers from the one obtained under full information
on ability because screening contracts alter the di¤erence between indirect utilities that rms
o¤er to the workers. Specically, in Regime 1 and 2, the share of high-types hired by the more
e¢ cient rm increases and, as a result, distortions in the sorting of high-ability workers decrease
with respect to the full information market equilibrium. Conversely, the share of low-types
hired by the more e¢ cient rm falls so that distortions in sorting of low-ability workers increase.
Sorting obtained under Regime 2 is overall less distorted than the one obtained under Regime
1. In Regime 3 sorting remains the same as under full information. Countervailing incentives
emerge in all three regimes. In regimes 2 and 3, high-ability workers are worse o¤ than under
full information because of upward distorted e¤ort levels and lower indirect utilities. Low-ability
workers on the other hand are better o¤ because their utility increases. Results are ambiguous
to this respect in Regime 1.
We conclude that, when rms have di¤erent marginal productivities, CfCA increases sur-
plus but it also increases rmscompetition for high-ability workers. As a result, CfCA benets
high-ability workers but is detrimental to rms. CfCA increases the existing distortion in sorting
of high-ability workers to rms: too many workers are hired by the least e¢ cient rm. When
ability is not observable, screening contracts are such that this distortion decreases when CfCA
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is low and remains unchanged when CfCA is high. In addition, countervailing incentives (par-
tially) erode the additional surplus appropriated by high-ability workers in the full information
equilibrium, and the more so when CfCA is high.
Considering that the case where ability is observable can be interpreted as the study of
selection of senior job market candidates, while the case of private information may correspond
to selection of junior candidates, we observe the following. CfCA empowers all senior talented
job market applicants, including the ones employed by the least e¢ cient rm, but junior talented
applicants entering the labor market for the rst time are not able to appropriate the same
surplus. The latter is substantially eroded by screening contracts which imply lower rent for
and overincentivization of talented workers.
As mentioned before, in the main text we study a specication of the model where only high-
ability workers care for their coworkersability. This specication is tractable and intuitions are
easy to grasp. In Appendix A.9, we study a richer version of the model, where both workers
types are concerned with their coworkersability. We show that our simplied model is able to
capture all main results on the market equilibrium and on workerssorting obtained with the
richer specication.
1.1 Related literature
From an analytical point of view, our paper draws from the literature on multi-principals initi-
ated by the seminal contributions of Martimort (1992) and Stole (1992). Within this literature,
the paper that is most closely related to ours is Rochet and Stole (2002) which extends the
analysis carried out in Stole (1995) and studies duopolists competing in nonlinear prices in
the presence of both vertical and horizontal preference uncertainty.3 We depart from Rochet
and Stole (2002) in that they only consider symmetric rms and thus nd that incentive com-
patibility constraints are always slack for all rms, so that e¢ cient quality allocations with
cost-plus-xed-fee pricing emerge in equilibrium.4
In the literature on workers selection, the papers closest to ours are Bénabou and Tirole
(2016) and Barigozzi and Burani (2019). Bénabou and Tirole (2016) embed multitasking and
screening in a Hotelling framework. Workers engage in two activities, one in which individual
contributions are not measurable and are driven by motivation, and the other which is con-
tractible and dependent upon a workers ability. When motivation is observable, while ability is
3Two other papers analyzing optimal contracts by multiple principals that are related are Biglaiser and Mezzetti
(2000) and Lehmann et al. (2014). The former studies an incentive auction in which multiple principals bid for the
exclusive services of an agent, who has private information about ability. The latter considers optimal nonlinear
income taxes levied by two competing governments.
4Precisely the same result can be found in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) who model rms as directly supplying
utility to consumers.
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private information, equilibria range from the case of monopsonistic underincentivization of low-
skilled work to the other extreme case of perfectly competitive overincentivization of high-skilled
work. With respect to that paper we innovate in several directions. First, we introduce CfCA in
the workplace. Second, we consider heterogeneous rms. Third, in our setup, workerstaste for
rms is not observable, it inuences the sorting of workers into rms and interacts with skills in
determining incentive pay in equilibrium. In terms of results, we share with Bénabou and Tirole
(2016) the fact that competition for the most talented workers generates countervailing incent-
ives for high-ability types. We nd screening contracts similar to the ones of Bénabou and Tirole
(2016) as a special case (see our Regime 3). Specically, when CfCA is su¢ ciently large, we
show that both rms distort the e¤ort of high-ability workers upward. However, the interaction
between rmsheterogeneity and CfCA generates new results: for low relevance of CfCA, we
nd equilibria where the least e¢ cient rm always distorts e¤ort of high-ability workers upward
and the more e¢ cient rm may or may not distort e¤ort of low-skilled workers downward.
Barigozzi and Burani (2019) study a setting with a for-prot and a non-prot rm competing
to attract workers who are intrinsically motivated to contribute to the mission of the non-
prot rm.5 The setting of the two papers presents some similarities because workers di¤er in
ability and in a second characteristic which corresponds to intrinsic motivation in Barigozzi and
Burani (2019) and in taste for rms in this papers. In the two papers both characteristics
are the workersprivate information and intrinsic motivation in Barigozzi and Burani (2019)
is uniformly distributed among the applicants, like the taste for rms in the present setting.
However, our setting is di¤erent because CfCA generates a peer e¤ect in workerspreferences
which translates into an additional interdependence in labor demands of the two rms. This is
why the equilibrium set of optimal screening contracts is richer in our paper than in Barigozzi
and Burani (2019).
2 The model
We study a Hotelling-like competitive screening model, where workers care about the ability of
their coworkers. Two rms compete to hire workers: rm A is located at zero whereas rm B
is located at 1. Each worker (she) can work exclusively for one rm and supplies e¤ort, which
represents the only input necessary to produce. Firms and workers are risk neutral.
Firms
5Barigozzi and Burani (2019) is in turn related to Barigozzi and Burani (2016). The latter considers output-
oriented motivation, so that a workers intrinsic satisfaction depends on her personal contribution to the output
produced. In Barigozzi and Burani (2019) instead, workersmotivation does not depend on e¤ort (or output)
provision so that the single-crossing condition holds and, like in the current paper, rms only screen workers for
their ability.
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Let x denote the observable and measurable e¤ort level that workers are asked to provide. Firms
production functions display constant returns to e¤ort and the amount of output produced is
qi (x) = kix for rm i = A;B, where the marginal product of labor ki is rm-specic. Without
generality loss we assume that rm A has a weak competitive advantage so that kA  kB:
Payo¤s per-worker, conditional on the worker being hired, are given by
i (x) = qi (x)  wi (x) = kix  wi (x) ; (1)
where wi (x) is the wage or salary paid by rm i to the worker exerting e¤ort x and where the
unit price of output is exogenous and set to 1.
Workers
There is a unit mass of workers who are uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line. They di¤er
in two characteristics: ability and the taste for rms. Ability is inversely related to the cost of
providing e¤ort and is denoted as j ; with j 2 f1; 2g ; where 2 > 1 and   2   1. A
fraction 1 of workers has a low cost of e¤ort (i.e., high ability) 1 and a fraction 2 = 1 1 has a
high e¤ort cost (i.e., low ability) 2. Workersaverage ability is denoted by E() = 11 + 22.
The mismatch disutility depends on the workers location on the Hotelling line , which is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1] ; and by the cost per unit distance .
Let us dene bj ; where 0  bj  1, j = 1; 2; the type-specic marginal worker who is
indi¤erent between being hired by rm A and by rm B. Given that rm A is located in 0
and rm B is located in 1, 1b1 + 2b2 is the workforce employed by rm A while 1 (1  b1) +
2 (1  b2) is the workforce employed by rm B.
We innovate with respect to the existing literature by assuming that workers care about their
coworkersability. Specically, high-ability workers receive a utility premium if their employer
hires a majority of them and su¤er a disutility otherwise. To be precise, take rm A and the
share of its high-type employees, namely b1:When b1 > 1=2 high-ability workers hired in rm A
receive a premium, whereas high-ability workers hired by the competitor su¤er a loss of the same
amount. When b1 < 1=2 premium and loss are reversed. Because high-ability workers receive
a benet that is increasing in the share of colleagues of the same type, we can say that the
workplace displays homophyly among high-skill workers.6 In the conclusion we discuss possible
job-market mechanisms resulting in a workersutility function which increases with the quality
of their coworkers.
6Using the terminology of the Management Literature, our high-ability workers can be interpreted as status
starswho bring social status to their peers (as opposed to performance starswho increase the overall perform-
ance of the organization); see Kehoe et al. (2016) and the references within.
In the Economic Literature, a recent paper by Bolte et al. (2020) studies the consequences of homophily in the
worplace. In their setting, referrals and homophily lead to social immobility. Specically, a demographic groups
low current employment rate leads that group to have relatively low future employment as well.
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The workersutility function when hired by rm A and by rm B; respectively, are given
by:


























where the relevance of CfCA is represented by the parameter 1  0, while 2 = 0. In words,
workers utilities depend on (i) their net compensation, Ui (j) ;i.e., the salary less the cost of e¤ort
provision (ii) their mismatch disutility and, for high-ability workers, (iii) the utility premium
(loss) when their coworkers include the majority (the minority) of the high-skill workforce.
Hence, CfCA translates into a premium for high-types if their employer is able to hire a larger
share of high-ability workers than its competitor and in a utility loss su¤ered by high-types
employed by the rm hiring the lower share of them.7 Note that, when employed by rm B; a
high-type workers premium for coworkersability is +1 ((1  ̂1)  1=2) =  1 (̂1   1=2). In
Appendix A.9 we present and discuss a richer specication of the utility function with 2 > 0
so that premiums or losses from coworkersability accrue to both types of workers.8
The average ability of workers employed by rm i = A;B; Ei () ; writes:
EA () =
11b1 + 22b2
1b1 + 2b2 ;
EB () =
11 (1  b1) + 22 (1  b2)
1 (1  b1) + 2 (1  b2) :
Note that a more e¢ cient workforce is characterized by a lower Ei (), i = A;B; because 2 > 1.
The following three possible workerssorting patterns exist.
Lemma 1 Workerssorting.
(i) when b1 = b2, each rm hires the same share of high- and low-ability workers and the average
ability of the workforce is the same for the two rms: EA () = EB () = E().
(ii) when b1 > b2, rm A hires a larger share of high- than of low-ability workers so that it
employes the workforce with the higher average ability: EA () < EB () :
(iii) when b1 < b2 rm A hires a lower share of high- than of low-ability workers so that it
employes the workforce with the lower average ability: EA () > EB ().
Expressions (2) and (3) imply that neither the mismatch disutility nor CfCA are related to
e¤ort exertion and they do not a¤ect directly the rms output. This implies that a workers
7The fact that ̂1 > 1=2 does not necessarily imply that rm As workforce has a larger average ability than
rm B. Indeed this requires that ̂1 > ̂2 as we show below.
8Referring again to the Management literature, in this case status starsbring social status not only to their
peers but to all colleagues.
8
indi¤erence curves have positive slope in the (x;w) plane and that the single-crossing property
holds, no matter the hiring rm.
Contracts and screening mechanism
Anticipating the workersdecisions, rms i = A;B o¤er incentive-compatible non-linear wage
schedules wi (xi) that are conditional on the e¤ort target. Recall that workers of any type j
have preferences over e¤ort-salary pairs which are independent of  and of b1; (conditional on
being hired by a given rm). To determine the wage schedules we study the direct revelation
mechanism such that each rm o¤ers two incentive-compatible contracts, one for each ability type
j , consisting in an e¤ort target and a wage rate, i.e. fxi (j) ; wi (j)gi=A;B; j=1;2. The contracts
o¤ered by the two rms, determine the indirect (gross) utilities of a worker who truthfully reports
her ability type j . We then use these to tackle the workers self-selection problem across rms,
which depends on mismatch disutility  and on the concern for the coworkers quality (b1   1=2) :
We thus treat the rmscontract design problem as independent of the workerschoice about
which rm to work for. The latter is considered as an indirect mechanism, because no report on
 is required. Finally, it is convenient to focus on workersindirect utility Ui (j), gross of the
mismatch disutility and of the premium for coworkers quality. Consequently, we derive contracts
of the form fxi (j) ; Ui (j)gi=A;B; j=1;2.
2.1 Marginal workers
Given the non-linear wage schedule wi (xi) o¤ered by rms i = A;B, a worker of type j









Denoting by xi (j) the solution to this, one can write





i (j) ; (4)
where Ui (j) is the indirect utility of an agent of type j who is hired by rm i, absent the
mismatch disutility and the premium/loss from coworkers ability. Hence, a worker of type
(j ; ) gets total indirect utility





if employed by rm A and total indirect utility





if employed by rm B.
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The participation constraints require that
UA (j)  0 and UB (j)  0 for all j 2 f1; 2g : (PC)
When the market is fully covered, given rm is o¤er, the outside option of each type of worker
is represented by the contract o¤ered by the rival rm  i:9
We are now in the position to determine the share of workers of each type employed by the
two rms.
The worker who is indi¤erent between working for rm A and for rm B is bj such that




UA (1)  UB (1)





UA (2)  UB (2)
2
: (8)
Note that, when 1 = 0 we return to the standard Hotelling labor demands: bj = 1=2 +
(UA (j)  UB (j)) =2; j = 1; 2: When instead 1 = ; the marginal worker of type 1 is
indeterminate. If 1 < , high-ability workersCfCA is not so strong to reverse the standard
Hotelling forces in (7) and an interior solution for b1 is possible. Formally, when it comes
to the determination of the marginal worker, 1 is equivalent to a reduction in the mismatch
disutility.
Interestingly, when 1 > ; CfCA leads to a corner solution with all high-types employed by
one rm. To see this, use (5), to write the utility of the high-type marginal worker when hired
by rm A as:
UA (1; b1) = UA (1)  b1 + 1  b1   12 = UA (1)  b1 (   1)  121: (9)
From (9), when 1 >  we have that UA (1) is monotonically increasing in b1: In addition,
UA (1; )  UA (1; b1) 8  b1 because the mismatch disutility is lower for workers located to
the left of the marginal worker b1 but the premium/loss for coworkersquality is the same as for
worker (1; b1). In other words, when 1 > ; the utility of type (1; b1) hired by A, and that
of all types with  < b1, increases monotonically with b1. Similarly, the utility of type (1; b1)
hired by B; and that of all types located on the right of b1; decreases monotonically with b1.
9The option that workers prefer to remain unemployed is excluded by assuming that the market is fully covered
or that
UA (j) + UB (j) > ;8j = 1; 2;
see Rochet and Stole (2002, page 290). This is equivalent to say that the total utilities of the marginal workers are
non-negative: UA
 
j ; bj  = UB  j ; bj   0, j = 1; 2, where bj is the marginal worker of type j in equilibrium.
In our setting, these inequalities hold if ki; i = A;B is su¢ ciently larger than , which we assume. See also our
comments before Proposition 1.
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Thus, if UA (1) > UB (1) there is corner solution with b1 = 1. If UA (1) < UB (1) the corner
solution entails b1 = 0:
To better understand the impact of 1 on workerssorting when  > 1, or when an interior
solution for b1 is possible, let us consider (7) and (8) and observe that
b1   b2  0 if and only if (UA (1)  UB (1))  (UA (2)  UB (2))
2 (   1)
 0:
Hence we can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 If 1 < ; then:
EA ()  EB ()() UA (1)  UA (2)  UB (1)  UB (2) (10)
and EA () = EB () requires that UA (1)   UB (1) = UA (2)   UB (2) : A su¢ cient (but not
necessary) condition is UA (1) = UB (1) and UA (2) = UB (2) :
In other words, if 1 < ; rm A is able to hire a better workforce if and only if it o¤ers
high-types a larger return to ability than its competitor (UA (1) UA (2)  UB (1) UB (2)).
3 Equilibrium contracts when taste for rms is not observable
Suppose that 1 <  and that workersability is observable, while mismatch disutility  is the
workers private information. We derive optimal contracts fxi (j) ; Ui (j)gi=A;B; j=1;2 under
full information on ability.
Let us write the rmsprots as a function of the workersutility. Solving (4) for the wage
rate:





i (j) : (11)
Plugging the previous expression into the rmspayo¤s (1), we can rewrite per-worker prots
relative to each type j as





i (j)  Ui (j) : (12)
Each rm maximizes prots obtained by multiplying (12) with their workforce determined
by expressions (7) and (8). Hence, rm A and B respectively solves the following program:




















A (2)  UA (2)

























Note that U i (j) ; which enters the expression of the marginal worker bj , j = 1; 2, is taken
as given by the two rms. Because the workers type j is observable and, bj only depends
on Ui (j) and U i (j) (and not on Ui ( j) and U i ( j)), rms indeed maximize prots per-
workers for each type and Program Pi can be decomposed into two programs.10 Firms compete
to attract high-types and respectively solve:









A (1)  UA (1)










B (1)  UB (1)
 (P1i)
Simultaneously, rms compete to attract low-types and respectively solve:









A (1)  UA (2)










B (2)  UB (2)
 (P2i)
One can easily check that the second order conditions with respect to Ui (1) ; i = A;B;
require:
1 < ; (Equ. SOC)
which is the same condition to possibly have an interior solution for high-typesmarginal worker.
The workerstypes being observable, rms are able to require the e¢ cient e¤ort level from
each worker:






These e¤ort levels ensure that the surplus per-worker, Si (j)  kixi (j)   12jx
2
i (j) ; is max-
imized. Intuitively, the best that each rm can do is to maximize the surplus per-worker and
then use a fraction of the surplus to attract the workers.
Let us substitute e¤orts in rmsPrograms P1i and P2i by their rst best levels (13) and
then derive rm is prots with respect to Ui (j) ; j = 1; 2; by taking U i (j) as given. One
obtains two reaction functions for each rm in which indirect utility Ui (j) o¤ered by rm i is
a function of U i (j) o¤ered by the rival rm. For high-types, reaction functions are
UA (1) =





UB (1) ; (14)
UB (1) =





UA (1) ; (15)
10See Appendix A.9 for a richer model where marginal types bj , j = 1; 2, depend on Ui (j), U i (j), Ui ( j)
and U i ( j)), i.e. on indirect utilities of both types. Despite full information on ability, here rms maximize
expected prots instead of prots per-workerss type.
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UA (2) : (17)
The two pairs of expressions (14)-(15) and (16)-(17) show that indirect utilities Ui (j) ; i = A;B;
j = 1; 2; are strategic complements.
Then we solve the two systems of two reaction functions in two unknowns and obtain the

























Hence, kA > kB implies that UA (1) > U

B (1) and U

A (2) > U

B (2); if the rms are identical,
indirect utilities are the same and the equilibrium is symmetric. From (18)-(19) one can also
check that CfCA benets high-type workers who receive a larger Ui (1) when 1 > 0 than when
1 = 0: Specically, the indirect utility of all high-ability workers increases by the amount 1:
Substituting Ui (i) ; i = A;B; j = 1; 2; in (7) and (8) one obtains the expressions for
marginal workers:
b1 = 12 + k2A   k2B121 (   1)  12 ; (22)
b2 = 12 + k2A   k2B122  12 ; (23)
where b1 is increasing in 1 and the rm with a competitive advantage hires a larger share of
both high and low-type workers. Interior solutions require
b1 < 1, k2A   k2B < 61 (   1) ; (24)b2 < 1, k2A   k2B < 62; (25)
where inequality (24) implies (25) because 61 (   1) < 62. Intuitively, rm B remains
active in the market only if rm As competitive advantage is not too high relatively to workers
mismatch disutility. The condition for an interior b1 can also be written as
b1 < 1 , 1 < 01     k2A k2B61 : (26)
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This implies that, when kA > kB but rmsheterogeneity is not too high, starting from a value
of 1 close to zero and letting 1 grow larger, an interior solution where b1 < 1 rst exists.
Then b1 increases with 1 and hits the corner solution b1 = 1 for 1  01.
Finally, we have b1   b2 = (k2A k2B)(211+(2 1))1212( 1)  0; (27)
so that rm A, holding a competitive advantage, not only hires a larger share of both workers
types, but also employes a workforce characterized by a larger average ability.
Total utilities Ui (j) of marginal workers in equilibrium are given by:
UA (1; b1) = UB (1; b1) = k2A + k2B   6141 + 1; (28)
UA (2; b2) = UB (2; b2) = k2A + k2B   6242 : (29)
Total utilities are increasing moving from the marginal workers to the workers located at the
two extremes of the Hotelling line. This is because taste for rms, , is not observable so that
all the workers di¤erent from the marginal ones obtain an additional rent. Hence, once the
participation constraints of the two marginal workers are met, all the other workers necessarily
receive a strictly positive payo¤. Inspection of (28) and (29) conrms that high-ability workers
payo¤ is increasing in the concern for coworkersquality.
Note that having UA

j ; bj = UB j ; bj  0, j = 1; 2; not only ensures that all workers
receive a positive payo¤ so that their participation constraint is satised, but also that the













Thus, the condition for a fully covered market requires a  su¢ ciently lower than k2A+k
2
B; while,
from (24) and (25), the condition for an interior solution requires a  su¢ ciently larger than
k2A   k2B.11
Let us now consider prots in equilibrium. By plugging expressions for e¤ort levels xi (j)
and indirect utilities Ui (j) ; i = A;B; j = 1; 2; into (P1) one can check that rm B earns
11Putting all conditions together, market is fully covered and the solution is interior for workers of type 2
(b2 < 1) if:
k2A   k2B
62












Market is fully covered and the solution is interior for workers of both type 1 and 2
 bj < 1 for j = 1; 2 if:
k2A   k2B + 611
61













positive prots and that rm A earns higher prots than B : A > 

B > 0. Interestingly, the
















which is negative under condition (24). In words: when an interior solution exists and both
rms hire a positive share of high-ability workers, CfCA decreases rmsprots.
Results so far are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Full information on ability. (i) When ability is observable while mismatch
disutility is the workers private information, equilibrium contracts are the Nash equilibrium
contracts fxi (j) ; Ui (j)gj=1;2; i=A;B of the game in which rms compete in the utility space
and are dened by e¢ cient e¤orts (13) and by indirect utilities (18)-(21).
(ii) When rms are identical (kA = kB) they equally share the workforce of both types: b1 =b2 = 12 and EA () =EB ().
(iii) When kA > kB; then rm A hires a larger share of both types and the better workforce:b1 > b2 > 12 and EA () < EB ().
(iv) The share of high-types b1 hired by rm A increases with 1 and b1 < 1 holds for k2A k2B <
61(   1) and 1 < 01; where 01 is expressed in (26). If one of the previous two conditions
does not hold, then b1 = 1: The share of low-types b2 hired by rm A is independent of 1 andb2 < 1 holds for k2A   k2B < 62: If the opposite inequality holds, then b2 = 1:
(v) The concern for coworkersquality benets high-ability workers (including the ones hired by
rm B) but is detrimental to rms.
Let us consider point (v) of the above proposition. From expressions (18) and (19) we observe
that high-types indirect utility is increasing in 1. Intuitively, high-type workers hired by rm
B must be compensated for the utility loss su¤ered because they belong to the workforce with
the relatively lower average ability. But, given that indirect utilities are strategic complements,
workers employed by rm A also have to be compensated accordingly. By contrast, CfCA is
detrimental to rms. Intuitively, 1 decreases the mismatch disutility of high-type workers and
thus increases competition. As a result, the intercepts of the two reaction functions move in
opposite directions and reaction functions cross each other farther away from the origin (see
equations (14) and (15)): rms o¤er higher indirect utilities to the workers when 1 > 0 than
when 1 = 0: Note that low-type workers are not a¤ected by CfCA.
In Appendix A.9, we solve again for market equilibrium using the richer specication for
CfCA. By doing so we show that our reduced model, together with being tractable, is able to
capture the main results on market equilibrium and on workerssorting obtained with the richer
specication.
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In the following section we study the optimal allocation which maximizes a social welfare
function and compare it to the equilibrium.
4 Welfare analysis
To assess how CfCA a¤ects surplus and whether the market equilibrium under full information
on ability yields e¢ cient workerssorting, one has to compare the equilibrium allocation with
the one that maximizes total surplus.
4.1 The e¢ cient allocation
We assume an utilitarian social welfare dened as the sum of the rmsprots and workers









R 1bj [B (j) + UB (j)] dF () ; (PSW )
where prots i (j) are dened in (12) and workers total utilities UA (j) and UB (j) are
expressed in (5) and (6). E¤ort levels fxA (j)gj=1;2 are the e¢ cient ones (see 13).


















2 + 1 (1  ̂1)








In words, welfare depends on the surplus produced by the specic matching of rms and workers,
on the mismatch disutility paid by workers and on the (net) premium/loss received by high-type
workers because of their CfCA.
Specically, the rst line (30) of SW shows how surplus is a¤ected by the two rmsmarginal
productivity. When rm A has a competitive advantage, it hires a relatively larger workforce
which increases social welfare because this increases the benet from the matching between
rms and workers. The second line (31) shows the total mismatch disutility. Finally, line (32)










). Note that the last term is the unique one which depends on 1 and
that SW is monotonically increasing in 1 provided that ̂1 6= 12 : CfCA increases social surplus.
One can easily check that the derivative of maxf̂jgj=1;2 SW with respect to 1 is positive,
conrming that, when concern for coworkers matters, the e¢ cient sorting increases surplus.
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In a symmetric allocation with b1 = 1=2; the surplus generated by the premium for cowork-
ersability vanishes while the total mismatch disutility is minimized at  =4: An asymmetric
allocation is optimal when kA > kB because it creates both an additional surplus from the
matching of rm A and high-types and a net premium from coworkersquality which together
are larger than the additional mismatch disutility.





which is more stringent than the SOC of the rmsprogram requiring 1 < . To be able to
compare the market allocation with the e¢ cient one we assume from now on that First-best
SOC holds.
E¢ cient sorting entails:
bfb1 = 12 + k2A   k2B41 (   21)  12 (33)
bfb2 = 12 + k2A   k2B42  12 (34)
bfb1   bfb2 =  k2A   k2B (211 + (2   1))412 (   21)  0: (35)
Conrming that, when kA > kB; it is e¢ cient that rm A hires a larger share of workers of each
type. We also observe that bfb1 is monotonically increasing in 1:
An e¢ cient interior allocation requires:
bfb1 < 1 () k2A   k2B < 21 (   21)bfb2 < 1 () k2A   k2B < 22: (36)
showing that rms heterogeneity must be su¢ ciently low. Moreover, if we have an interior
solution for b1, we also have one for b2. The interior condition for bfb1 can also be written as
bfb1 < 1 () 1 < 001  12   k2A k2B41 : (37)
Like in the market equilibrium (see expressions (24) and (25)), when kA > kB but rmshet-
erogeneity is not too high, starting from a value of 1 close to zero and letting 1 increase, an
interior solution where bfb1 < 1 emerges rst. Then bfb1 increases with 1 and hits the corner
solution bfb1 = 1 for 1  001. Thresholds levels are however di¤erent than in the market
equilibrium, as we explain below.
The following proposition summarizes results on the e¢ cient matching of workers and rms.
Proposition 2 E¢ cient sorting. (i) When rms are identical (kA = kB) they equally share
the workforce of both types: bfb1 = bfb2 = 1=2 and EfbA () =EfbB ().
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(ii) The concern for coworkers ability increases total surplus.
(iii) When kA > kB then rm A hires a larger share of both types and a workforce characterized
by larger average ability: bfb1 > bfb2 > 1=2 and EfbA () < EfbB () :
(iv) The optimal share of high-types bfb1 is increasing in 1 and is interior (bfb1 < 1) if k2A k2B <
21(   21) and 1 < 001; where 001 is expressed in (37). If one of the previous two conditions
does not hold, then bfb1 = 1: The solution for low-types is interior (bfb2 < 1) if k2A   k2B < 22:
If the opposite inequality holds, then bfb2 = 1:
To understand the economic forces generating workerssorting when kA > kB, let us start
with low-ability workers. The additional mismatch disutility arising when b2 moves on the
right of 1=2 is traded o¤ with having a larger share of workers employed by the relatively more
productive rm A. A similar reasoning applies for high-type workers who, being relatively more
productive, benet even more from the good matching with the more e¢ cient rm so thatbfb1 j1=0 > bfb2 (compare expression (33) when 1 = 0 with (34)). But now CfCA becomes also
relevant. Specically, a second benet from moving b1 on the right arises from the larger share
of high-type workers employed by rm A who enjoy the premium from coworkersability. A
third one arises because, as a result, there are fewer high-type workers employed by rm B who
su¤er the disutility from coworkerslower-than-average ability.
The following chain of inequalities holds: bfb1 > bfb1 j1=0 > bfb2 and the higher 1; the
higher the benet from moving b1 to the right of 1=2. As a consequence the di¤erence between
marginal types
bfb1   bfb2  and the average ability of the workforce in rm A both increase
with 1. Since, in the market allocation, e¤orts are set at the e¢ cient level, the unique possible
distortion is in workerssorting to rms.
4.2 Is market equilibrium e¢ cient?
Recall that, in the market equilibrium, each rm determines the indirect utilities to be o¤ered to
its workers by maximizing its prots while taking the indirect utility o¤ered by the rival rm as
given. Marginal workers are then determined indirectly by substituting the equilibrium indirect
utilities (18)-(21) into (7) and (8). In the rst best, instead, marginal workers are such that
the sum of rmsprots and workersutilities is maximized. Recall that e¤orts are set at their
e¢ cient levels in equilibrium.
Let us compare (22)-(23) and (33)-(34). From Propositions 1 and 2 it follows:
Corollary 1 (i) When rms are identical (kA = kB) the concern for coworkersability does not
a¤ect surplus and the market allocation is fully e¢ cient.
(ii) When rms are heterogeneous (kA > kB), the concern for coworkersability increases total
surplus but reduces rmsprots. Specically:
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(iia) When condition (24) holds so that an interior solution emerges for both marginal workers,
market sorting is ine¢ cient because the share of high- and low-ability workers employed by rm
A is too low. In addition, the average ability characterizing the workforce hired by rm A is too
low and the one of rm B is too high (EA() > E
fb





(iib) In the market equilibrium, an interior solution emerges too often.
Interestingly, only high-ability workers appropriate the surplus generated by CfCA when
rms are heterogenous. When 1 > 0, rms get a lower share of a larger surplus and are worse
o¤. Strategic interaction prevents even the more e¢ cient rm A from appropriating a part of
the increased return from the matching between high-ability workers and the more e¢ cient rm.
We further elaborate on that in Proposition 3.
As expressed in part (iia) of the corollary, too few high-ability and too few low-ability workers
are employed by rm A in equilibrium (bj < bfbj ; j = 1; 2). This result in itself is not su¢ cient
to compare the average ability of workers hired by the two rms. However, one can easily check
that b1 b2 < bfb1  bfb2 so that that average ability in rm A is ine¢ ciently low; see expressions
(27) and (35). Finally, part (iib) of the corollary is explained by the fact that threshold values
for interior solutions are such that 01 > 
00
1; see (26) and (37). Hence, as 1 increases, a corner
solution is reached faster in the e¢ cient allocation than in the market equilibrium. In other
words, the region of the parameters such that b1 < 1 is too large.
What is the source of the ine¢ cient sorting observed at the market equilibrium? Is it a
consequence of strategic interaction between the two rms, a result of prot maximization, or
both? To address these questions we study the multi-rm monopsonists solution in Appendix
A.2. We show that sorting obtained by a monopsonist is ine¢ cient, but to a lesser extent than
sorting in the market allocation:
b1 < bM1 < bfb1 ; (38)b2 < bM2 < bfb2 : (39)
Consequently, we conclude that strategic interaction and prot maximization jointly contribute
to the distortion in workerssorting. The following proposition provides further details:
Proposition 3 Market sorting is ine¢ cient for three reasons that sum up and all contribute
to the downward distortion of b1 and b2: (i) Prot maximization implies that average mis-
match disutility is disregarded and only the highest mismatch disutility, i.e. the one of marginal
workers, is considered. (ii) Strategic interaction acts through two channels. (iia) Indirect
utilities are set in such a way that the more e¢ cient rm A accommodates too much while the
less e¢ cient rm B competes too aggressively. (iib) In the Nash equilibrium, the externality
generated by the concern for coworkers ability is only partially internalized by the two rms.
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This specic channel due to strategic interaction pushes towards a lower b1 but does not a¤ectb2:
The e¤ect of prot maximization, accounted for in part (i) of the proposition is relevant both
for the monopsonist and for the two competing rms. Basically, when maximizing prots, rms
focus on the two marginal workers and on their specic mismatch disutility while disregarding
the average mismatch disutility of the whole workforce (the latter corresponds to the term (31)
in the expression of the social welfare function). By so doing the monopsonist and the competing
rms weight the mismatch disutility of the marginal workers too much and, as a result, marginal
workers are too close to 1=2: Prot maximization explains why the inequalities bM1 < bfb1 andbM2 < bfb2 in (38) and (39) hold.
Let us move to part (ii) of the proposition and, for the sake of exposition, consider the
case 1 = 0. First of all recall that, under full information on ability, e¤orts are set at the
e¢ cient levels and thus here competition does not increase allocative e¢ ciency. In other words,
competition only generates a distortion in sorting due to strategic interaction (that sum up to
the ine¢ ciency due to prot maximization) and explains the inequalities b1 j1=0 < bM1 j1=0 andb2 < bM2 ; the latter appearing in (39). By taking the indirect utilities o¤ered by the competing
rm as given, rm A ends up being too accommodating (rm A does not pay workers enough)
while rm B is too aggressive (rm B pays workers too much) so that too many workers are
employed in the less e¢ cient rm B:
Finally, part (iib) of the proposition indicates that, when CfCA matters (1 > 0), we observe
an additional source of distortion in sorting of high-ability workers due to strategic interaction
and which operates thought the externality introduced by workerspeer e¤ects. Specically,
rm A disregards the utility loss su¤ered by high-type workers employed by rm B while rm
B disregards the premium accruing high-types hired by rm A: This further reduces b1.
5 Equilibrium contracts when neither taste for rms nor ability
are observable
We now assume that workersabilities are no longer observable. The objective of rms A;B
continues to be represented by Program Pi. However, unlike in the previous sections, each rm
has now to consider total prots, and not just prots by type P1i and P2i: Most importantly,
rms now take into account the workers incentive compatibility constraints. Provided that
both rms are able to hire workers with both ability levels, there are two incentive compatibility
constraints for each rm: the downward incentive constraint (henceforth DIC) requiring that
high-ability types are not attracted by the contract o¤ered to low-ability types and the upward
incentive constraint (henceforth UIC) requiring that low-ability types do not gain by mimicking
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high-ability workers. For each rm i = A;B, these constraints (written in terms of e¤ort levels
and utilities) are given by12
Ui (1)  Ui (2) +
1
2
(2   1)x2i (2) ; (DICi)
and
Ui (2)  Ui (1) 
1
2
(2   1)x2i (1) : (UICi)
These constraints depend neither on mismatch disutility  nor on the marginal worker bj ;
j = 1; 2. Combining DICi and UICi yields
1
2
(2   1)x2i (2)  Ui (1)  Ui (2) 
1
2
(2   1)x2i (1) ; (40)
which shows that incentive compatible contracts must satisfy: (i) the monotonicity condition
xi (1)  xi (2) ; requiring that high-ability workers exert more e¤ort than low-ability types at
each rm i = A;B; and (ii) condition Ui (1)  Ui (2) ; requiring that high-ability workers get
an indirect utility not lower than the one of low-ability types, for each employer i = A;B.
In Lemma 4 (see Appendix A.5), among other results, we show that the two constraints
cannot be binding simultaneously when 2  1. This suggests that, as it is generally the
case in this type of models (see also Bénabou and Tirole 2016), only one or the other incentive
constraint will typically bind at a given point, which we now assume.
In addition, as under full information, the participation constraints PC must be met.
To sum up, rms simultaneously design menus of contracts of the form fxi (j) ; Ui (j)gi=A;B; j=1;2
by maximizing Program Pi with respect to the e¤ort level and the indirect utility associated to
each type  worker, taking as given the indirect utility U i () that the rival rm leaves to the
worker, and subject to the two incentive compatibility constraints DICi and UICi and to the
participation constraints PC. Once optimal screening contracts fxi (j) ; Ui (j)gi=A;B; j=1;2 are
derived, workers compute the corresponding non-linear transfer schedule wi (xi) for i = A;B,
select the preferred one and thus choose which rm to work for.
In what follows we assume that screening continues to entail b1  b2 (as under full informa-
tion on ability). Hence, the rm with a competitive advantage hires a share of high-types larger
than the share of low-types and employes a workforce characterized by a larger average ability.13
In other words, we assume that distortions introduced by asymmetric information do not a¤ect
indirect utilities so much to change the nature of workerssorting.
We rst study under which conditions, if any, the full information equilibrium is incentive
compatible so that it remains the solution when types are not observable. Then we turn to the
12DICi is obtained by considering Ui (1)  wi(2)  121x
2
i (2) ; where the r.h.s. of the previous inequality is









i (2) = Ui (2) +
1
2
(2   1)x2i (2) :
13Specically, this assumption will be relevant for the proof of Lemma 4; see Appendix A.5. An equivalent
assumption is used in Barigozzi and Burani (2019).
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case where at least one rm has a binding incentive constraint and study the di¤erent regimes
that can occur.
5.1 Neither DICi nor UICi are binding
We rst check conditions, if they exist, such that the market equilibrium obtained when ability
is observable is incentive compatible. Consider contracts fxi (j) ; Ui (j)g, i = A;B, j = 1; 2;
where xi (j) = x
fb
i (j) = ki=j and U

i (j) are described in (18)-(21) and substitute them into
DICi and UICi, i = A;B. One immediately observes that UICB is always met (see Appendix
A.3 for more details). Rearranging the other incentive constraints one nds that they are met
if the following conditions hold:




3k2B(2   1)  1(k2A   k2B)

 a1; (41)






A   k2B)  3k2A(2   1)

 b1; (42)






A   k2B) + 3k2A(2   1)

 c1: (43)
In Appendix A.3 we prove the following result.
Lemma 3 (i) When kA = kB = k the market allocation described in Proposition 1 is incentive
compatible if the following condition holds
0  1 
(2   1)2
2221
k2 = a1 = 
c
1: (44)
(ii) When kA > kB the market allocation described in Proposition 1 is incentive compatible if
the following two conditions hold








When kA = kB = k; DICi; i = A;B; are always satised and, UICi; i = A;B; are met
if Condition (44) is satised. The condition shows that, if CfCA is su¢ ciently small and/or
heterogeneity in workers ability (2   1) su¢ ciently large, then contracts o¤ered under full
information on ability are incentive compatible. Interestingly, if workers do not care for their
coworkersability (i.e., if 1 = 0), the market allocation is always incentive compatible when the
two rms are identical.14 Hence, CfCA reduces the likelihood that the allocation characterized
in Proposition 1 is incentive compatible.
14 In the case where kA = kB = k and 1 = 0; the result is reminiscent of Rochet and Stole (2002) who consider
identical rms and nd that incentive constraints are always slack for all rms, so that e¢ cient quality allocations
with cost-plus-xed-fee pricing emerge at equilibrium. See also Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Barigozzi and
Burani (2019).
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When kA > kB conditions are more stringent. First, condition (45) continues to require that
1 must be small. In addition, heterogeneity in workersability (2   1) must be relatively
larger than heterogeneity in rmsproductivity (kA   kB); see condition (46).
Conditions (44)(46) together show that incentive compatibility is more likely to be achieved
when workersheterogeneity is su¢ ciently large. Indeed, when workerstypes are su¢ ciently
di¤erent from each other, mimicking is too costly to be attractive. Specically, Condition (46)
indicates that, to have incentive compatible full information contracts, workersheterogeneity
must be su¢ ciently higher than rmsheterogeneity.
5.2 Screening contracts
We now proceed with the characterization of optimal screening contracts, when conditions (44)
(46) are not met so that full information contracts are no longer incentive compatible. Firms
will then design contracts that are constrained by incentive compatibility. Which constraints
are relevant depends on the parametersvalue and di¤erent regimes have to be considered. The
following analysis holds when each rm is able to hire both high- and low-ability workers, that
is when the second chain of inequalities in Footnote 11 is met.
In Remark 1 (see Appendix A.4), we study the ranking of the three threshold values a1;
b1 and 
c
1 dened in (41)-(43) and we identify conditions on 1; k and  such that each
incentive constraint starts to be binding when (44)-(46) are not met. Figure 1 below reports the




1; depending on whether heterogeneity
in workersability is larger or lower than rmsheterogeneity.
Lemma 4 (see Appendix A.5) complements Remark 1. It studies the two rmsprograms
Pi; i = A;B; when DICi and UICi are taken into account and only one constraint may bind
for each rm. We show that DIC cannot be binding for rm B, whereas for rm A, we show
that UICA can be binding only if 1 is su¢ ciently large.
Combining results from Remark 1 and from Lemma 4 established the following proposition
(see also Figure 1).
Proposition 4 Under competition and screening, when conditions (44)(46) do not hold, UICB
is always binding whereas DICB is always slack.
Letting 1 grow larger and considering the threshold values appearing in (41)-(43), the following
three regimes become relevant in turn:
Regime 1 Both UICB and DICA are binding for










Figure 1: The di¤erent regimes according to the relevance of the concern for coworkersability.















; kA 6= kB and a1 < 1  c1:









Regime 1 occurs for low values of 1; because the condition 0 < 1  b1 ensures that DICA
is binding (see Remark 1). Moreover when, (2   1)=1  (k2A   k2B)=3k2A; UICB is necessarily
binding because a1 < 0. Hence, this regime holds for rms heterogeneity relatively larger
than heterogeneity in workersability. This means that Regime 1 never occurs when rms are
identical.
When 1 grows larger Regime 2 becomes relevant. Condition (2   1)=1  (k2A   k2B)=3k2A
again implies that UICB is binding because a1 < 0; while 
b
1 < 1  c1 ensures that DICA and
UICA are both slack (see Remark 1). When instead (2   1)=1 > (k2A   k2B)=3k2A then DICA
is always slack because b1  0, whereas a1 > 0 holds so that 1 > a1 > 0 implies that UICB
is binding. The condition a1 < 1 < 
c
1 ensures that UICB is binding but UICA is slack. Note
that, when kA = kB; then a1  c1 and this regime disappears.
Finally, when 1 > c1; UICB is binding and, provided that condition =(   1) 
A (2) =A (1) > 1 is also met, UICA is binding as well. The chain of two inequalities is
necessary for having UIC binding and DIC slack for rm A (see Remark 4). Absent CfCA
(1 = 0), the chain of two inequalities would not hold, UICA could not be binding and this
regime would not exist. Interestingly, Regime 3 is the only one that is compatible with the case
of identical rms.
The following proposition, established in Appendix A.7, A.6 and A.8, summarizes the main
properties of the equilibria achieved in the di¤erent regimes. Recall that superscript  denotes the
equilibrium when ability is observable (characterized in Section 3); now superscript  indicates
the equilibrium under screening.
Proposition 5 Equilibrium contracts under screening.
Optimal contracts fxi (j) ; Ui (j)gi=A;B; j=1;2 are such that:
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Regime 1 (i) Firm A sets the e¢ cient e¤ort level for high-ability workers, xA (1) = x
fb
A (1),
whereas it distorts downward the e¤ort of low-ability workers, xA (2) < x
fb
A (2). Firm B
sets the e¢ cient e¤ort level for low-ability workers, xB (2) = x
fb
B (2), whereas it distorts
upward the e¤ort of high-ability workers, xB (1) > x
fb
B (1); (ii) In rm A; U

A (1) >
UA (1) and U

A (2) < U

A (2) whereas, in rm B; U

B (1) < U

B (1) and U

B (2) >
UB (2) : Strategic complementarity between indirect utilities o¤ered to the same workers
type mitigate overall departures from the values of Ui (j) ; i = A;B; j = 1; 2, obtained
under full information.
Regime 2 (i) Firm A sets the e¢ cient e¤ort level for both high and low-ability workers, xA (1) =
xfbA (1) and x

A (2) = x
fb
A (2); rm B sets the e¢ cient e¤ort level for low-ability work-
ers, xB (2) = x
fb
B (2), whereas it distorts upward the e¤ort of high-ability workers,
xB (1) > x
fb
B (1); (ii) High-typesindirect utilities are lower than at the full information
equilibrium (Ui (1) < U

i (1)) whereas low-typesones are higher (U





Regime 3 (i) Firms A and B set the e¢ cient e¤ort level for low-ability workers, xi (2) =
xfbi (2) ; i = A;B, whereas they both distort upward the e¤ort level of high-ability work-
ers, xi (1) > x
fb
i (1) ; i = A;B. (ii) High-typesmarginal utilities are lower than at
the full information equilibrium (Ui (1) < U

i (1)) whereas low-types ones are higher
(Ui (2) > U

i (2)); i = A;B.
First of all, recall that reaction functions (14)-(17) imply that indirect utilities o¤ered to the
same workerstype under full information on ability are strategic complement. Let us start from
Regime 2 where only UICB is binding. Here, rm B needs to increase UB (2) and to decrease
UB (1) in order to discourage mimicking by low-types. And, given strategic complementarity,
rm A changes its indirect utilities accordingly and in the same direction, but the change is lower
than the one implemented by rm B: Overall, this will make b1 increase and b2 decrease. Let us
now move to Regime 1 where both UICB and DICA are binding. In Regime 1, rm B still needs
to increase UB (2) and decrease UB (1) as before, but now rm A needs to decrease UA (2)
and to increase UA (1) in order to discourage mimicking by high-types. All changes in Ui (1)
and Ui (2) ; i = A;B; induce a reactions by the competitor, via strategic complementarity, and
U i (1) and U i (2) will change accordingly. But now the two rms change indirect utilities in
opposite directions and those changes partially o¤set each others. As a consequence b1 and b2
will move in the same direction as under Regime 2, but the overall change in b1 and b2 will be
smaller. This in turn implies that, under Regime 1, strategic complementarity between indirect
utilities mitigates overall departures from the values of Ui (j) obtained under full information.
Distortions in e¤ort levels are larger in Regime 1 than in Regime 2 because, under the latter,
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only the e¤ort level of high-types employed by rm B is distorted, while all the other e¤ort
levels are e¢ cient. Conversely, changes in the location of marginal workers are larger in Regime
2 as stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Sorting under screening. Workerssorting is such that:
Regime 1 (i) The share of high-types employed in rm A increases (b1 > b1) whereas the share
of low-types employed in rm A (b2 < b2) decreases. (ii) Screening contracts improve
average quality of the workforce employed in rm A and impair average quality of the
workforce employed in rm B (b1   b2 > b1   b2).
Regime 2 Sorting is like under Regime 1. Points (i) and (ii) above continue to hold but the
changes in marginal types and in the workforces average quality are larger.
Regime 3 (i) Screening contracts do not a¤ect the average quality of the workforce because the
share of high and low-types employed by the two rms remains constant: b1 = b1 andb2 = b2 : (ii) If kA > kB then b1 = b1 > b2 = b2 ; if kA = kB then b1 = b1 = b2 =b2 = 1=2.
Recall that, when kA > kB; workerssorting is ine¢ cient in the market allocation with full
information on ability because both marginal workers are located too close to 1=2 and because
the average ability of workers hired by rm A is too low. By increasing the share of high-types
hired by rm A; Regime 1 and 2 decrease distortions in the sorting of high-ability workers. At the
same time, by decreasing the share of low-types hired by rm A; they also increase distortions in
the sorting of low-ability workers. Given that the two e¤ects together imply b1  b2 > b1 b2 ;
the distortion in average ability of the workforce employed by rm A decreases. For the reasons
explained below Proposition 5, those e¤ects are stronger in Regime 2 than in Regime 1. Hence
we conclude that Regime 2 decreases distortions in workerssorting more than Regime 1. Given
that Regime 2 is also characterized by a lower distortions in e¤ort levels, we can conclude that
the allocation obtained under Regime 2 is overall more e¢ cient than the one obtained under
Regime 1.
Let us now move to Regime 3. Under this regime, distortions in workerssorting remain the
same as in the market equilibrium under full information on ability. However, indirect utilities
and the e¤ort levels of high-ability workers change in such a way that low-types are better o¤,
while both the rms and high-types are worse o¤. This regime may occur both with identical
and heterogeneous rms (i.e. for kA  kB): Looking at the two cases separately, when rms are
identical (kA = kB), workerssorting is not distorted (bj = bj = bfbj = 1=2; j = 1; 2) but e¤ort
levels of high-types are upward distorted. When instead rms di¤er (kA > kB); both workers
sorting and high-typese¤ort levels are distorted.
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To sum up, when ability is not observable and either Regimes 2 or Regime 3 prevails,
the distortion in sorting of high-ability workers decreases while the one of low-ability workers
increases with respect to market equilibrium under full information. When Lemma 3 holds and
under Regime 3, instead, workers sorting remains the same. Note that CfCA substantially
enriches the set of possible solutions under screening. Indeed, when 1 = 0; only two cases
may occur: either full information contracts are incentive compatible or Regime 1 emerges (see
Figure 1). CfCA makes Regime 2 and 3 possible.
From the point of view of the workforce, private information on ability impairs high-ability
workers and benets low-types both under Regime 2 and under Regime 3. Specically, the e¤ort
exerted by high-types is upward distorted, at least in rm B; so that we observe overincentiv-
ization of high-skilled work like in Bénabou and Tirole (2016). In addition, indirect utility of
high-types is reduced with respect to the case of private information, hence talented workers
are worse o¤. Conversely, low-types still exert the e¢ cient level of e¤ort and receive a larger
indirect utility than under full information, thus they are better o¤. This welfare comparison
is ambiguous in Regime 1 because a di¤erent incentive constraint is binding for each rm. A
general result in our setting is that, when (45) and (46) do not hold so that the full information
solution is not incentive compatible, no matter the prevailing regime, private information on
ability leads to an upward distortion of the e¤ort exerted by high-types employed by the least
e¢ cient rm B and to a fall of their indirect utility. Hence, we can conclude that CfCA benets
all high-types under full information but that their additional surplus is at least partially eroded
when ability is not observable. Returning to our example, this implies that CfCA empowers
all senior talented job market applicants, also the ones employed by the least e¢ cient rm, but
junior applicants entering the job market for the rst time are disadvantaged by their private
information and are not able to appropriate the same surplus.
6 Concluding remarks
Consider a Ph.D. candidate receiving an o¤er from the Department of Economics of both
University-X and College-Y. Which o¤er should the young economist accept? The choice is
also likely to depend on the overall quality of the recruitment accomplished by each Depart-
ment. Indeed the candidates academic network, his/her future publishing prospects and re-
search funds opportunities all tend to increase with the quality of the faculty and the prestige
of the Department.
We consider a model where workersutility is increasing in the share of high-ability coworkers.
Specically, high-ability workersutility increases if they are employed by the rm hiring the
larger share of high-ability workers, while it decreases in the opposite case. By taking a rst step
towards analyzing the role played by the concern for coworkersquality in the hiring process, we
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contribute to the theory of organizations and to personnel economics. In addition, by studying
screening contracts we contribute to the literature on competition and screening when workerss
ability is not observable to rms.
We consider two (possibly) heterogeneous rms, located at the two extremes of the Hotelling
line, competing to attract workers whose ability can be either high or low and who are uniformly
distributed. The location on the Hotelling line represents workers taste for rm (mismatch
disutility) and is always the workersprivate information.
Under full information on ability, we show that CfCA expands total surplus, but is detri-
mental to rms because it increases competition for high-ability workers who appropriate all the
additional surplus. Except when rms are identical and hire half of the workforce of each type,
workerssorting to rms is distorted. The distortion in sorting is the results of three di¤erent
forces, all pushing toward an excess of workers of both types employed by the least e¢ cient rm:
prot maximization, strategic interaction and the externality generated by CfCA which is only
partially internalized by rms in equilibrium.
When ability is not observable, full information contracts are incentive compatible if CfCA
and rmsheterogeneity is su¢ ciently low and/or workersheterogeneity is large enough. When
full information contracts are not incentive compatible then, depending on which incentive con-
straints are binding, one of three possible regimes emerges where high-types face countervailing
incentives in at least one rm. Consequently, private information on ability erodes at least part
of the surplus that high-ability workers obtain via CfCA and the more so the higher the relev-
ance of CfCA. As for sorting, the opposite pattern occurs since when CfCA is low, sorting is
less distorted under asymmetric information than in full information; while a high CfCA implies
that the distortion in sorting does not change with information structure.
Our paper represents a rst step in the study of peer e¤ects in the workplace when they
are not related to (positive or negative) spillovers on workersproductivity. We focus on those
organizations where top workers bring value to the rm and their employees as research insti-
tutions and rms providing professional services. In the model we treated CfCA as a black box
and assumed that workers utility is increasing in the share of top workers employed by the
rm. While this is a shortcut that allows us to keep the model tractable, it can be explained by
di¤erent economics mechanisms. We present two examples.
First, in the case of junior job market candidates whose ability is not observable by rms,
coworkersquality may increase the workers career prospects outside the rm via a signaling
mechanism. Future prospective employers will perceive a junior job market candidate previously
employed by the rm hiring the majority of top workers as a worker above average. As a
consequence, in equilibrium, the discounted utility from protable future matching will accrue
all junior workers hired by the more prestigious rm.
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Second, let us introduce the product side of the market and consider that the two rms also
compete to attract consumers characterized by heterogeneous willingness to pay for products
quality. This generates a setting with both competition for talented workers in the labor market
and competition with vertical di¤erentiation à la Shaked and Sutton (1982) in the product
market. In the case of rms selling professional services, products quality is likely to increase
with the share of high-type workers that one rm is able to hire. In turn, by hiring the larger
share of high-type workers, a rm is able to o¤er a higher quality which translates into higher
prots. Hence, in case prots are partially shared with employees, workers utility increases
with the quality of their coworkers because a more qualied workforce produces a better output,
which implies higher prots for the rm and a larger payo¤ for its employees.
The model could be extended in many ways. The more natural one is considering perform-
ance and productivity spillovers in the workplace; see for example Groysberg and Lee (2008),
Ertug et al. (2018), Tan and Netessine (2019). A positive externality exerted by top workers on
the productivity of their colleagues is likely to further increase the ability of the more e¢ cient
rm to attract the best talents. Conversely, a negative externality exerted by top workers on
their coworkersproductivity will tend to mitigate both the boost in utility of high-ability work-
ers and the attractiveness of the more e¢ cient rm. Career concerns could also be taken into
account. A larger share of high-ability colleagues may imply a lower probability of promotions
which could partially or totally o¤set the premium from coworkersquality.
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Appendix
A.1 Maximizing the social welfare function
Indirect utilities in SW; Ui (j) ; cancel out and social welfare SW in the main text writes:





















R 1b1 kBxB (1)  121x2B (1)  (1  )   1  ̂1   12 dF ()
+2
R 1b2 kBxB (2)  122x2B (2)  (1  ) dF () :
Plugging the e¢ cient e¤ort levels (13) in the social welfare function the problem simplies to





















R 1b1 h k2B21   (1  )   1  ̂1   12i dF ()
+2
R 1b2 h k2B22   (1  )i dF ()
Solving the integral and rearranging yields the following expression
maxf̂jgj=1;2 i (j) = 1b1 h k2A21   12̂1 + 1  ̂1   12i
+2b2 h k2A22   12̂2i
+1 (1  b1) h k2B21   12 (1  b1)   1  ̂1   12i
+2 (1  b2) h k2B22   12 (1  b2)i :
Rearranging the previous formulation of the SW and isolating its three components, one derives
the three expressions (30), (31) and (32) in the main text.
A.2 The multi-rm monopsonist
To understand why workers sorting at the market equilibrium is ine¢ cient let us derive the
allocation generated by a multi-rm monopsonist maximizing the joint prots of rm A and
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= 1b1A (1) + 2b2A (2)
+1 (1  b1)B (1) + 2 (1  b2)B (2) (PM )
where b1 and b2 are given by (7) and (8) respectively, while i (j) is dened by (12).
The rm optimally sets the utilities of marginal workers to zero: UA (1; b1) = UB (1; b1) = 0
and UA (2; b2) = UB (2; b2) = 0. This implies:
UA (1) = b1   1  ̂1   12 (A.1)
UB (1) = (1  b1) + 1  ̂1   12 (A.2)
UA (2) = b2 (A.3)
UB (2) = (1  b2) (A.4)
Substituting the rst-best e¤ort levels, xfbi (j), in i (j) and plugging the indirect utilities
(A.1)-(A.4) into the expressions for b1 and b2 and i (j) ; we obtain a simplied version of Pro-
gram PM which only depends on bj ; j = 1; 2: Hence the monopsonist solves: maxfbjgj=1;2 E  M
and optimal marginal workers are:
bM1 = 12 + k2A   k2B81 (   1)  12
bM2 = 12 + k2A   k2B82  12
bM1   bM2 =  k2A   k2B (211 + (2   1))812 (   1)  0
Comparing the previous inequalities with (33)-(34) and with (22)-(23) shows that the ranking
of marginal types is like in (38) and in (39) in the main text. Hence, sorting designed by the
monopsonist is not e¢ cient but the distortion is lower than the one at the market equilibrium.
One can easily check that, like b1 and bfb1 ; also bM1 is increasing in 1: Finally, @(bfb1  bM1 )=@1 >
0 and @(bM1   b1)=@1 > 0 hold.
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A.3 Proof of Remark 3
Substituting equilibrium contracts into the incentive compatibility constraints DICi and UICi;
i = A;B; one can check that they are incentive compatible if the following conditions are met:
DICA : 3k
2
A(2   1)2 + 61122  2(2   1)(k2A   k2B) (A.5)
UICA : 3k
2
A(2   1)2 + 1(2   1)(k2A   k2B)  61221 (A.6)
DICB : 3k
2
B(2   1)2 + 2(2   1)(k2A   k2B) + 61221  0 (A.7)
UICB : 3k
2
B(2   1)2  1(2   1)(k2A   k2B) + 61221 (A.8)
Hence, DICB always hold.
First consider kA = kB = k: One can see that DICA is always met in this case and that
UICA and UICB become identical and they are satised if condition (44) holds. This proves
part (i) of Remark 3.
Solving (A.5), (A.6) and (A.8) for 1 (we omit A.7 because DICB is always slack) one nds
conditions (41)-(43) in the main text and the three relevant threshold values for 1: Recall that,
if (41)-(43) are met, then all UIC and DIC are slack and the market equilibrium is incentive
compatible. The best case scenario is when b1  0 so that DICA is always met, together with
a1 > 0 so that UICB can be met for 1 < 
a
1. Note that 
b
1  0 holds when 3k2A(2   1) 
2(k
2
A   k2B)) while a1 > 0 holds if 3k2B(2   1) > 1(k2A   k2B): Both the previous inequalities
are thus met if 3k2B(2   1) > 2(k2A   k2B)); which proves part (ii) of Remark 3.
A.4 A rst step to derive the relevant incentive constraints
Let us consider again incentive constraints in (41)(43) and check which constraints becomes






Remark 1 Let us consider the market equilibrium under full information on ability and assume
that conditions (44)-(46) do not hold; depending on the value of 1; incentive constraints become
relevant as follows.
(i) For 1 > c1 the binding constraints are UICA and UICB:







- for 0 < 1  b1 the binding constraints are UICB and DICA;
- for b1 < 1  c1 the binding constraint is UICB:







- for 0 < 1  a1 equilibrium contracts are incentive compatible
- for a1 < 1 < 
c




1 holds and this
case disappears).
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Proof. (i) The threshold c1 is always the highest among the three. Note that UICA binds
for 1 > c1: If 1 > 
c
1; then DICA is slack but UICB is binding. This explains point (i) of
Remark 1.
The ranking of a1 and 
b
1 depends on the relative magnitude of  and k as follows.
(ii) When 2 11 <
k2A k2B
3k2B























1: The binding constraints are thus as
depicted in part (ii) of Remark 1.
(iii) When 2 11 >
k2A k2B
3k2B
























1: Hence, in this case the binding constraints
are as depicted in part (iii) of Remark 1.
A.5 A second step to derive the relevant incentive constraints
The following results help us to fully characterize the regimes that are relevant for the rms.
Lemma 4 (i) Two programs are relevant for rm A : the one where UICA is slack while
DICA is binding and the one where DICA is slack while UICA is binding. The latter re-
quires that  1 >
A(2)
A(1)
> 1: (ii) Only one program is relevant for rm B; namely the one
where DICB is slack while UICB is binding.
In order to prove Lemma 4, let us rst consider a preliminary step. Let us express incentive
constraints in terms of rms payo¤s relative to each ability type, whereby DICi becomes
i (1)  i (2)  Si (1)  Si (2) 
1
2
(2   1)x2i (2)
and UICi takes the form
i (1)  i (2)  Si (1)  Si (2) 
1
2
(2   1)x2i (1) ;
where






is the surplus realized by a worker of type j providing e¤ort xi (j) for rm i (again, absent the
mismatch disutility and the benet accruing from the premium for coworkersability and the
mismatch disutility, when j = 1).
Remark 2 (i) If DICi is binding for rm i = A;B, then per-worker payo¤s are such that
i (1) > i (2) : (ii) If UICi is binding for rm i = A;B, then per-worker payo¤s are such that
i (2) > i (1) :
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Proof. The proof of this result follows an argument similar to the one developed by Rochet
and Stole (2002). When DICi is binding for rm i = A;B, e¤ort levels are such that xi (2) 
xFBi (2) and xi (1) = x
FB
i (1) ; namely, the high-ability type gets the rst-best allocation while
the e¤ort of the low-ability type is downward distorted. Moreover, when DICi is binding, one
has
i (1)  i (2) = Si (1)  Si (2) 
1
2
(2   1)x2i (2) :
The right-hand-side of the above equality is minimized when xi (2) is the highest possible, that
is when it equals the rst-best e¤ort level and surplus Si (2) is maximized. Substituting for
such e¤ort level yields

















Similarly, when UICi is binding for rm i = A;B, e¤ort levels are such that xi (2) = xFBi (2)
and xi (1)  xFBi (1) ; namely, the low-ability type gets the rst-best while the e¤ort of the
high-ability type is distorted upwards. Moreover, when UICi is binding, one has
i (1)  i (2) = Si (1)  Si (2) 
1
2
(2   1)x2i (1) :
The right-hand-side of the above equality is maximized when xi (1) is the lowest possible, that
is when it equals the rst-best e¤ort level and surplus Si (1) is maximized. Substituting for
such e¤ort level yields
i (1)  i (2) = Si (1)  Si (2)  12 (2   1)x
2





When neither DICi nor UICi is binding, then each rm sets all e¤ort levels at the rst-best
and the di¤erence in per-worker payo¤s i (1)  i (2) can be either positive or negative.
Let us now move to the actual proof of Lemma 4. As mentioned in the main text we assume
that, under asymmetric information on ability, it is still true that ̂1  ̂2. What follows builds
on the proof of Propositions 4 and 5 in Barigozzi and Burani (2019).
 Firm A solves:














A (2)  UA (2)

s:t: UA (1)  UA (2)  12 (2   1)x
2
A (2)  0 (DA)
UA (2)  UA (1) + 12 (2   1)x
2
A (1)  0 (UA)
(PA)
where  1+UA(1) UB(1)2( 1) = ̂1 and
+UA(2) UB(2)
2 = ̂2: In addition, DA  0 and
UA  0 are the Lagrangian multiplier of the DICA and UICA incentive constraint,
respectively.
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FOCs w.r.t. xA (j) ; j = 1; 2; respectively are:
1
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)
(kA   1xA (1)) + UA (2   1)xA (1) = 0 (A.9)
2
 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
(kA   2xA (2))  DA (2   1)xA (2) = 0 (A.10)
FOCs w.r.t. UA (j) ; j = 1; 2; respectively are:
1







A (1)  UA (1)

  1
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)










A (2)  UA (2)

  2
 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
  DA + UA = 0 (A.12)
 When DIC and UIC are both binding, (40) writes:
1
2
(2   1)x2A (2) = UA (1)  UA (2) =
1
2
(2   1)x2A (1)
and xA (1) = xA (2) = xA must hold. In addition DA and UA must be strictly positive
and (A.9) and (A.10) imply:
1̂1 (kA   1xA) + UA (2   1)xA = 0 (A.13)
 2̂2 (kA   2xA) + DA (2   1)xA = 0 (A.14)
Summing up (A.13) and (A.14) gives:
1̂1 (kA   1xA)  2̂2 (kA   2xA) + (UA + DA) (2   1)xA = 0:
Hence:
UA + DA =
2̂2 (kA   2xA)  1̂1 (kA   1xA)
(2   1)xA
> 0;





or, given that both ratios appearing in the right hand side
of the previous inequality are larger than one, 2  1:
When instead 2 is not larger enough than 1; DIC and UIC cannot be both binding
because FOCs (A.9) and (A.10) become mutually incompatible. This suggests that only one or
the other incentive constraint will typically bind at a given point.
 When DICA is slack while UICA is binding, then DA = 0 and UA > 0: Hence (A.11)
and (A.12) become:
1







A (1)  UA (1)

  1
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)









A (2)  UA (2)

  2
 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2











A (1)  UA (1)

  1
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)











A (2)  UA (2)

  2
 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
< 0 (A.16)
where A (1)  kAxA (1)  121x
2
A (1) UA (1) and A (2)  kAxA (2)  122x
2
A (2) 
UA (2) : Substituting per-worker prots in (A.15) and (A.25) and simplifying:
A (1)
2 (   1)
>
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)




 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
Recall that it must be ̂1  ̂2 or  1+UA(1) UB(1)2( 1) 
+UA(2) UB(2)
2 : Hence, the previ-




   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)
   1






Per-worker prots must thus satisfy: A(1) 1 >
A(2)
 : In addition, from Remark 2, UICA binding





 When UICA is slack while DICA is binding, then DA > 0 and UA = 0: Hence (A.11)
and (A.12) become:
1







A (1)  UA (1)

  1
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)










A (2)  UA (2)

  2
 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
  DA = 0
(A.18)
Substituting for per-worker prots, dropping DA and rearranging:
A (1)
2 (   1)
<
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)




 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
Recall that it must be ̂1  ̂2; which implies  1+UA(1) UB(1)2( 1) 
+UA(2) UB(2)
2 : Hence
the previous two inequalities are compatible with both the following chains of inequalities:























 + UA (2)  UB (2)

:
From Remark 2, DICA binding implies that A (1) > A (2) : Note that, if A (1) >




 and thus the chain of inequalities in (A.19) must
hold. To conclude, the program where UICA is slack while DICA is binding is possible
without additional constraints on    1.
 Firm B solves:














B (2)  UB (2)

s:t: UB (1)  UB (2)  12 (2   1)x
2
B (2)  0 (DB )
UB (2)  UB (1) + 12 (2   1)x
2
B (1)  0 (UB )
(PB)
Where DB  0 and UB  0 are the Lagrangian multiplier of theDICB and UICB incentive
constraint, respectively. Using the same reasoning as before, only one or the other incentive
constraint will typically bind at a given point.
FOCs w.r.t. xB (j), j = 1; 2; respectively are:
1

   1   UA (1) + UB (1)
2 (   1)

(kB   1xB (1)) + UB (2   1)xB (1) = 0 (A.20)
2

   UA (2) + UB (2)
2

(kB   2xB (2))  DB (2   1)xB (2) = 0 (A.21)
FOCs w.r.t. UB (j), j = 1; 2; respectively are:
1







B (1)  UB (1)

  1
   1   UA (1) + UB (1)
2 (   1)










B (2)  UB (2)

  2
   UA (2) + UB (2)
2
  DA + UA = 0
(A.23)
 Let us consider the instance where DB = 0 while UB > 0 so that DICB is slack while
UICB is binding. From (A.22) and (A.23):
1







B (1)  UB (1)

  1
   1   UA (1) + UB (1)
2 (   1)










B (2)  UB (2)

  2
   UA (2) + UB (2)
2
+ UA = 0
(A.25)
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Substituting for per-workers prots B (1) in (A.24) and (A.25) and dropping UB :
B (1)
2 (   1)
>
   1   UA (1) + UB (1)





   UA (2) + UB (2)
2
(A.27)
Recall that it must be 1  ̂1  1  ̂2; which implies  1 UA(1)+UB(1) 1 
 UA(2)+UB(2)
 :
In addition, from Remark 2, UICB binding implies that B (1) < B (2) : Thus, inequal-
ities (A.26) and (A.27) are fully compatible and we may have either B(2) >
B(1)
 1 if 1 is
su¢ ciently small or the opposite. So the case where DICB is slack while UICB is binding
is possible and no additional constraints are required.
 Let us consider the case where DB > 0 while UB = 0 so that DICB is binding while
UICB is slack. From (A.22) and (A.23):
1







B (1)  UB (1)

  1
   1   UA (1) + UB (1)
2 (   1)










B (2)  UB (2)

  2
   UA (2) + UB (2)
2
  DA = 0
(A.29)










   UA (2) + UB (2)

(A.31)
Considering that it must be  UA(2)+UB(2) 
 1 UA(1)+UB(1)
 1 ; inequalities in (A.30)




   UA (2) + UB (2)










 1 is a contradiction and it is impossible that DICB is binding while UICB is slack.
Hence, the program of rm B is compatible only with UICB binding.
A.6 Regime 2: only UICB is binding
In this regime, rm A solves an unconstrained program while rm B solves a program where
DICB is slack while UICB is binding so that DB = 0 while UB > 0.
Hence, considering the program of rm A; PA; the FOCs w.r.t. xA (j) are the same as
under full information and the e¤orts are set at the e¢ cient levels, xA (1) =
kA
1





= xfbA (2). From the FOCs w.r.t. UA (j) one observes that rm As reaction
functions are the same as under full information (see (A.11) and (A.12) and expressions (14)
and (16)): UA (1) =
k2A+21(UB(1)+1 )
41




Considering the program of rm B; PB; with DB = 0 and UB > 0; from (A.20) and
(A.21)one can check that xB (2) is set at the e¢ cient level, i.e. xB (2) =
kB
2
= xfbB (2) ; while
the FOCs w.r.t. xB (1) now writes:
1 (1xB (1)  kB)
UA (1)  UB (1) + 1   
2 (   1)
+ UB (2   1)xB (1) = 0
hence
1 (1xB (1)  kB)
UA (1)  UB (1) + 1   
2 (   1)
< 0
where    1 > 0 holds while UA (1)   UB (1) + 1    < 0 is the condition assuring that
an interior solution for the marginal worker of type 1 exists or that ̂1 < 1. Thus it must be
1xB (1)  kB > 0 or xB (1) >
kB
1
= xfbB (1) meaning that the e¤ort of high-types is upward
distorted.
By substituting xB (2) =
kB
2






















B (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)
  1
   1   UA (1) + UB (1)
2 (   1)
  UB = 0:






















By solving for UB (1) the FOC (A.22) of the unconstrained program PB where UB = DB = 0
and xB (j) = x
fb


















Because the surplus kBxB (1)   121x
2
B (1) is maximized for x
fb
B (1) ; comparing (A.32) and
(A.33) one observes that UB (1) < U

B (1) :
Indirect utilities Ui (j) are strategic complements, hence UB (1) < U

B (1) implies U

A (1) <
UA (1) and U

B (2) > U

B (2) implies U

A (2) > U

A (2) : However, given that the slopes of
the two reaction functions are @UA(1)@UB(1) =
@UB(1)
@UA(1)
= 12 (see (14) and (15)); the change in U

A (j)
is lower than the change in UB (j) ; j = 1; 2; and we can conclude that ̂1 increases whereas ̂2
decreases w.r.t. the full information equilibrium.
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A.6.1 Numerical simulations under Regime 2
We present here some numerical simulations to show that all the neglected conditions and the
omitted constraints are indeed met. Take the following parameter values: kA = 6:5; kB = 4;
1 = 1; 2 = 1:2;  = 6, 1 = 0:3 and 1 = 2 = 0:5: These values assure that the solution is
interior in the case of full information on ability because conditions (k2A k2B < 61( 1)) and







and 0:14 = b1 < 1  c1 = 1:43 of Regime 2. Optimal contracts under full information on
ability are the following: fxA (1) ; UA (1)g = (6:5; 11:05); fxA (2) ; UA (2)g = (5:416; 7:958);
fxB (1) ; UB (1)g = (3:999; 6:675); fxB (2) ; UB (2)g = (3:333; 4:312); with ̂1 = 0:872 and
̂2 = 0:804: Under screening, optimal contracts become: fxA (1) ; UA (1)g = (6:5; 10:912);
fxA (2) ; UA (2)g = (5:416; 8:090); fxB (1) ; UB (1)g = (4:270; 6:399); fxB (2) ; UB (2)g =
(3:333; 4:576); with ̂1 = 0:895 and ̂

2 = 0:792: Comparing the solution under screening with
the one under full information on ability one observes that all the e¤ort levels remain the same
except xB (1) which is upward distorted. Indirect utilities decrease for high-types and increase
for low-types with respect to full information contracts. As a result of the changes in indirect







The marginal workersutilities under screening are above zero showing that the workers
participation constraints are slack. Finally, all prots per-worker are strictly positive and 0 <
B (1) < B (2) holds.
Interestingly, an increase in the parameter 1 (i.e. 1 = 0:8) leads to a corner solution with
̂1 = 1 in the equilibrium with screening but it is still compatible with an interior solution in
the full information equilibrium.
A.7 Regime 1: DICA and UICB are binding
In this regime, rm A solves the program where DICA is binding while UICA is slack so that
DA > 0 while UA = 0; while rm B solves the same program as before where DICB is slack
while UICB is binding so that DB = 0 while UB > 0.
Let us start from rm A: From (A.9) and (A.10) we have that xA (1) =
kA
1
= xfbA (1) while
the following equation holds for xA (2) :
2 (kA   2xA (2))
UA (2)  UB (2) + 
2
  DA (2   1)xA (2) = 0
or
2 (kA   2xA (2))
UA (2)  UB (2) + 
2
> 0





= xfbA (2) meaning that the e¤ort of low-types is downward distorted.
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A (1)  UA (1)
2 (   1)
  1
   1 + UA (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)





A (2)  UA (2)
2
  2
 + UA (2)  UB (2)
2
  DB = 0: (A.35)
Recall that the surplus is SA (j)  kAxA (j)  12jx
2
A (j) with S

A (1) = S
fb
A (1) and S

A (2) <
SfbA (2) because x

A (1) is at the e¢ cient level whereas x

A (2) is distorted. Substituting and
rearranging the two previous FOCs, they respectively become:
SfbA (1)  2U

A (1) + U

B (1)   + 1 < 0 (A.36)
and
SA (2)  2UA (2) + UB (2)   > 0 (A.37)
Also note that, in the unconstrained program of rm A where DB = UB = 0 , the previous
FOCs can be respectively written as:
SfbA (1)  2U

A (1) + U





A (2) + U

B (2)   = 0: (A.39)
As for type 1; putting together (A.36) and (A.38) one has:
SfbA (1) = 2U

A (1)  UB (1) +    1 <
2UA (1)  UB (1) +    1
or
2UA (1)  UB (1) < 2UA (1)  UB (1),
2 (UA (1)  UA (1))  (UB (1)  UB (1)) > 0 (A.40)
As for type 2; from (A.37) and (A.39) one can write:
SfbA (2) = 2U

A (2)  UB (2) +  >
SA (2) > 2U

A (2)  UB (2) + 
or
2UA (2)  UB (2) > 2UA (2)  UB (2),
(UB (2)  UB (2))  2 (UA (2)  UA (2)) > 0 (A.41)
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Moving to rm B; as in Regime 1 we have that xB (1) >
kB
1





= xfbB (2) so that the e¤ort of high-types is upward distorted while the e¤ort of low-types is
set at the e¢ cient level.




B (1)  UB (1)
2 (   1)
  1
   1   UA (1) + UB (1)
2 (   1)





B (2)  UB (2)
2
  2
   UA (2) + UB (2)
2
+ UB = 0: (A.43)
The surplus is SB (j)  kBxB (j)  12jx
2
B (j) ; with S

B (1) < S
fb
B (1) and S

B (2) = S
fb
B (2)
because xB (1) is distorted whereas x

B (2) is at the e¢ cient level. Substituting and rearranging
the two previous FOCs, they respectively become:
SB (1) + U

A (1)  2UB (1)   + 1 > 0 (A.44)
and
SfbB (2) + U

A (2)  2UB (2)   < 0 (A.45)
In the unconstrained program of rm B, the previous two FOCs can be written as:
SfbB (1) + U

A (1)  2UB (1)   + 1 = 0 (A.46)
and
SfbB (2) + U

A (2)  2UB (2)   = 0: (A.47)
As for type 1; putting together (A.44) and (A.46) one has:
SfbB (1) =  U

A (1) + 2U

B (1) +    1 >
SB (1) >  UA (1) + 2UB (1) +    1
or
2UB (1)  UA (1) > 2UB (1)  UA (1),
(UA (1)  UA (1))  2 (UB (1)  UB (1)) > 0 (A.48)
As for type 2; from (A.45) and (A.47) one can write:
SfbB (2) =  U

A (2) + 2U

B (2) +  =
SB (2) <  UA (2) + 2UB (2) + 
or
2UB (2)  UA (2) < 2UB (2)  UA (2),
2 (UB (2)  UB (2))  (UA (2)  UA (2)) > 0 (A.49)
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Now, for high-types consider (A.40) and (A.48) which together imply:
UA (1)  UB (1) > UA (1)  UB (1)
meaning that 1 > 

1 : As for low-types, (A.41) and (A.49) together imply:
UA (2)  UB (2) > UA (2)  UB (2)
or 2 < 

2 :
A.7.1 Numerical simulations under Regime 1
To show that all the neglected conditions and the omitted constraints are met, let us consider the
following parameter values: kA = 6:5; kB = 4; 1 = 1; 2 = 1:2;  = 6, 1 = 0:12 and 1 = 2 =
0:5: Again these values assure that the solution is interior in the case of full information on ability
(see conditions k2A   k2B < 61(   1) and k2A   k2B < 62 in Proposition 1); in addition they
now satisfy conditions 2 11 
k2A k2B
3k2A
and 0 < 1  b1 = 0:14 of Regime 1. Under screening
we obtain the following contracts: fxA (1) ; UA (1)g = (6:5; 10:866); fxA (2) ; UA (2)g =
(5:397; 7:952); fxB (1) ; UB (1)g = (4:238; 6:294); fxB (2) ; UB (2)g = (3:333; 4:497); ̂1 =
0:888 and ̂2 = 0:787: Now that also DICA is binding, both x

A (2) and U

A (2) decrease with
respect to optimal contracts under Regime 2 and, as a result of the following adjustments in
workersrents, marginal types slightly decrease with respect to before. One can check that the
di¤erence ̂1  ̂2 is the lowest under full information and the largest under Regime 2 where only
UICB is binding.
Also under Regime 2 marginal workersutilities are above zero showing that the workers
participation constraints are slack. All prots per-worker are strictly positive and 0 < B (1) <
B (2) and 0 < A (2) < A (1) hold.
A.8 Regime 3: UICA and UICB are binding
Let us start from rm A which now solves the program where DICA is slack while UICA is





= xfbA (2) while the following equation holds for xA (1) :
1 (kA   1xA (1))
UA (1)  UB (1) +    1
2 (   1)
+ UA (2   1)xA (1) = 0
or
1 (kA   1xA (1))
UA (1)  UB (1) +    1
2 (   1)
< 0




= xfbA (1) meaning that the e¤ort of high-types is upward distorted.
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Rearranging (A.11) and (A.12) with DA = 0 while UA > 0 and substituting for the
surpluses SA (1) < S
fb
A (1) and S

A (2) = S
fb
A (2) one nds:




A (2) + U

B (2)   < 0 (A.51)
In the unconstrained program of rm A where DB = UB = 0 , the previous FOCs can be
respectively written as in (A.38) and (A.39).
As for type 1; putting together (A.50) and (A.38) one has:
SfbA (1) = 2U

A (1)  UB (1) +    1 >
SA (1) > 2U

A (1)  UB (1) +    1
or
2UA (1)  UB (1) > 2UA (1)  UB (1),
(UB (1)  UB (1))  2 (UA (1)  UA (1)) > 0 (A.52)
As for type 2; from (A.51) and (A.39) one can write:
SfbA (2) = 2U

A (2)  UB (2) +  =
SfbA (2) < 2U

A (2)  UB (2) + 
or
2UA (2)  UB (2) < 2UA (2)  UB (2),
2 (UA (2)  UA (2))  (UB (2)  UB (2)) > 0 (A.53)
Inequalities (A.48) and (A.52) together write
(UB (1)  UB (1))  2 (UA (1)  UA (1)) > 0
(UA (1)  UA (1))  2 (UB (1)  UB (1)) > 0
which lead to a contradiction unless UB (1) UB (1) = UA (1) UA (1) < 0: Hence, it must
be UA (1) UB (1) = UA (1) UB (1). Using (18) and (19) one has that UA (1) UB (1)
= UA (1)   UB (1) =
k2A k2B
61
 0. Which implies that ̂1 = ̂1 = 12 +
k2A k2B
121( 1) : To sum up,
45
one has:
UB (1)  UB (1) = UA (1)  UA (1)
UB (1) < U

B (1) and U

A (1) < U

A (1)










121 (   1)
:
Repeating the same reasoning for types 2 one has that inequalities (A.49) and (A.53) to-
gether write
2 (UA (2)  UA (2))  (UB (2)  UB (2)) > 0
2 (UB (2)  UB (2))  (UA (2)  UA (2)) > 0
which lead to a contradiction unless UA (2)   UA (2) = UB (2)   UB (2) > 0: Hence, using
(20) and (21) and rearranging, UA (2) UB (2) = UA (2) UB (2) =
k2A k2B
62
 0 must hold.







: Hence, the following holds:
UA (2)  UA (2) = UB (2)  UB (2)
UA (2) > U

A (2) and U

B (2) > U

B (2)












We can conclude that workers sorting is not a¤ected by incentive constraints and ̂1 = ̂

1









2 . Type-1 workers and the two rms are worse o¤while type-2 workers
are better o¤ with respect to the market equilibrium under full information on ability.
A.8.1 Numerical simulations under Regime 3
Let us focus on a symmetric equilibrium because this is the unique regime that is compatible
with the rms being identical and thus equally sharing the market. Consider the following
parameters: kA = kB = 5; 1 = 1; 2 = 0:2;  = 3, 1 = 0:5 and 1 = 2 = 0:5: Again
these values assure that the solution is interior in the case of full information on ability (see
conditions k2A   k2B < 61(   1) and k2A   k2B < 62 in Proposition 1); in addition the
chosen parameters now satisfy conditions 2 11 
k2A k2B
3k2A
and 1 > c1 = 0:08 of Regime
3. Under full information, optimal contracts are: fxA (1) ; UA (1)g = fxB (1) ; UB (1)g =
(5; 10); fxA (2) ; UA (2)g = fxB (2) ; UB (2)g = (4:17; 7:42); entailing ̂1 = 0:5 and ̂2 = 0:5:
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Under screening, the e¤ort of high-types is upward distorted whereas indirect utilities of high-
types fall and the ones of low-types increase. In line with the theoretical predictions one ob-
tains the following screening contracts: fxA (1) ; UA (1)g = fxB (1) ; UB (1)g = (5:03; 9:97);
fxA (2) ; UA (2)g = fxB (2) ; UB (2)g = (4:17; 7:45); ̂1 = 0:5 and ̂2 = 0:5: The marginal
workersutilities are all above zero showing that the workersparticipation constraints are slack
and prots per-workers are strictly positive. Finally, condition  1 >
A(2)
A(1)
> 1; necessary for
Regime 3 to hold (see Corollary 4), is met.
A.9 A richer specication of the workersutility function
Suppose now that both high and low-ability workers are concerned with coworkersability. The
workersutility functions write:





A    + j (̂1   ̂2) ;
(A.54)







  (1  )| {z }
mismatch disutility
 j (̂1   ̂2) :| {z }
concern for coworkersability
(A.55)
A rst di¤erence from before it that 2 > 0 meaning that, low-types also care for coworkers
ability. A second di¤erence is that the low-type marginal worker, ̂2; enters the premium for
coworkers ability too. Thus, CfCA here translates in a premium for the worker only if her
employer is able to hire a larger share of high-ability than of low-ability workers (̂1   ̂2 > 0)
or if the worker belongs to the workforce characterized by the higher average ability. Instead, in
the reduced model, the concern for coworkersability only depends on the relative share of high
types. It may be natural to assume that 1  2 > 0: CfCA is lower for low-ability workers,
for example because they care less for the social statusof their rm or because they have less
career opportunity outside the rm.




( + 2) (UA (1)  UB (1))  1 (UA (2)  UB (2))





(   1) (UA (2)  UB (2)) + 2 (UA (1)  UB (1))
2 (   1 + 2)
(A.57)
The SOCs require again that    1 > 0 which we continue to assume.15 Here again CfCA is
not so strong to reverse the standard Hotelling forces.
15The objective of this section is to compare the market equilibrium allocation obtained in the reduced model
with the one obtained with this richer specication. Hence we disregard here both the welfare analysis and the
SOCs required to obtain the e¢ cient allocation.
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Expressions (A.56) and (A.57) show that marginal workers are now interdependent: b1 andb2 depend both on Ui (j) ; i = A;B, j = 1; 2 and on j ; j = 1; 2: Comparing those expressions
with (7) and (8) one observes the following. The di¤erence (UA (1)  UB (1)) now enters bothb1 and b2 and with a positive sign because, if that di¤erence increases, more high-types are
attracted in rm A and this accrues the premium for coworkersability that high and low-types
employed by rm A receive via the parameters 1 and 2; respectively. In addition, both b2
and b1 are decreasing in the di¤erence (UA (2)  UB (2)) because, if that di¤erence increases, a
larger share of low-types are attracted in rm A and this negatively a¤ects the premium received
by its employees via the parameters 1 and 2; respectively.
Even if expressions are richer, we show below that, with this specication, the basic intuitions
and results are conrmed. To start with, Remark 2 continues to hold and, at the interior solution,
it continues to be true that rm A is able to hire a better workforce only if it o¤ers high-types
a higher return to ability than its competitor.
A.9.1 Equilibrium contracts when workersability is observable
Plugging (A.56) and (A.57) together with rst-best e¤ort levels (13) into Pi, we solve rms
programs for indirect utilities. Here we can no longer solve two separated programs for low and
high-ability workers because the labor demands of the two rms include indirect utilities of both
workerstype. We derive rm is expected prots with respect to Ui (j) ; j = 1; 2; by taking
U i (j) as given and we nd two reaction functions for each rm in which indirect utilities
o¤ered by one rm are a function of Ui ( j) and of the ones o¤ered by the rival rm. Then we
solve the system of the four reaction functions in four unknowns and nd indirect utilities at the
equilibrium: U ei (i) ; i = A;B and j = 1; 2; where the superscript e indicates extendedmodel.
Substituting U ei (i) in (A.56) and (A.57) we then obtain the expressions for marginal workers.
We do not report here expressions of indirect utilities because they are long and tedious. By
plugging them into the expressions of marginal workersutilities and computing their derivatives
with respect to 1 and 2; one can check the following: the utility of high-type workers is
increasing in both 1 and 2; whereas the utility of low-types is decreasing in both 1 and 2.
The expressions for marginal workers write:




1112   3( + 2)212   22122

412[2 (11 + 22)
2   912(   1 + 2)]
(A.58)






1   3(   1)112   2212

412[2 (11 + 22)
2   912(   1 + 2)]
: (A.59)
Both (A.58) and (A.59) depend on 1 and 2: The di¤erence between marginal workers is:
be1   be2  0 ()  (k2A k2B)(2(11+22)(12+12)+312(2 1))412[2(11+22)2 912( 1+2)]  0: (C1A)
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Note that the denominator of the second terms of (A.58)-(A.59) and of Condition C1A is the
same. It goes to zero when 1 = ~1; where
0 < ~1 
 2(42 + 9) + 3
p
2(82 + (9  1))
41
< :
In words, the functions be1; be2 and (be1 be2) have the same vertical asymptote ~1; with 0 < ~1 < :
Studying be1; be2 and (be1   be2) as a function of 1 one can check that be1 and (be1   be2) are
monotonically increasing in 1 and tend to innity for 1 ! ~1: Except for very low values of
1; be2 is instead monotonically decreasing in 1 and tends to minus innity for 1 ! ~1; see
Figure 2.
Even if expressions are here more complex, the pattern of be1 is the same as in the reduced
model. When kA > kB but rmsheterogeneity is not too high, starting from a value of 1
close to zero and letting 1 grow larger, an interior solution where be1 < 1 rst exists. Then be1
increases with 1 and hits the corner solution be1 = 1 on the left of ~1 and remain 1 hereafter.
The novelty here is be2 which now depends on 1 as well. As mentioned before, except for
extreme values of the distribution of ; be2 decreases with 1 and a corner solution such thatbe2 = 0 is reached on the left of ~1. As an intuition, the higher the concern for coworkersability
and the larger the benet from having more workers hired in rm A than in rm B because
the share of workers enjoying the premium for coworkersability increases while the share of
workers su¤ering the loss decreases. Hence an increase in 1 has an e¤ect that is similar to
an increase in kA   kB; they both pushes towards a corner solution with be1 = 1. In addition,
whenever 1 > 2 the premium for high-types employed in rm A is larger than the loss su¤ered
by low-types employed in rm B, hence as 1 increases, the allocation also tends to a corner
solution with be2 = 0. Interestingly, when sorting is such that be1 = 1 and be2 = 0; a full market
segmentation emerges with all high-types employed in the more e¢ cient rm A and all low-types
hired in rm B: A full market segmentation does not occur when 1 = 2 unless  is very low
(but, given the condition 1 < ; this implies that 1 is very low as well). In this case an interior
solution with 12 < be1 < be2 < 1 is more likely.
The following proposition summarizes the main results for this specication of the model.
Proposition 6 Full information on ability (extended model). (i) When ability is ob-
servable while mismatch disutility is the workersprivate information, equilibrium contracts are
the Nash equilibrium contracts fxei (j) ; U ei (j)gj=1;2; i=A;B of the game in which rms compete
in the utility space and are dened by e¢ cient e¤orts xei (j) = x

i (j).
(ii) When rms are identical (kA = kB) they equally share the workforce of both types: be1 =be2 = 12 and EeA () =EeB ().
(iii) The problem is concave for 1 < : The high-type marginal worker, be1; and the di¤erence
between marginal types (be1   be2) are both increasing in 1: Except for very low values of 1; be2
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Figure 2: Market equilibrium in the extended model. Marginal workers b1 and b2 as a function
of 1 are shown when 2 = 1 = k = 1; 1 = 1=2;  = 2 and 2 = 2:5.
is decreasing in 1:
(iv) When kA > kB, then rm A hires a larger share of both types and the better workforce:be1 > be2 > 12 and EeA () < EeB ().
(v) If (kA   kB) is su¢ ciently high and/or 1 is su¢ ciently closer to ~1, then a corner solution
with be1 = 1 for high-types and a corner solution with be2 = 0 for low-types emerge. Corner
solutions are less likely when 1 = 2.
(vi) High-types utility increases with both 1 and 2: Low-types utility decreases with both 1
and 2:
Overall we can conclude that the reduced model analyzed in the main text is able to capture
the main e¤ects of CfCA on market equilibrium and on workerssorting. When 2 > 0; CfCA
empowers high-type workers via both 1 and 2. Low types, who where not a¤ected by CfCA
when 2 = 0, are impaired by both 1 and 2 when 2 > 0: In addition, CfCA may lead to a
market equilibrium with full market segmentation.
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